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De-dollarisation, sanctions, war premia, sovereign reserve shifts. A complete 2026 overview of where the market sits and what to watch next.
Contents16 sections
- 01De-dollarisation and the BRICS+ settlement layer
- 02BRICS+ expansion and mBridge
- 03Petrodollar cracks
- 04Central banks dumping Treasuries for gold
- 05Sanctions and reserves: the post-2022 regime
- 06OFAC compliance and the bullion chain
- 07Reserve diversification beyond gold
- 08War premia: Middle East, Ukraine and tail-risk pricing
- 09The inflation hedge debate: gold vs CPI vs TIPS
- 10Gold vs Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities
- 11Why the hedge fails over short horizons
- 12BIS, IMF and the prudential plumbing
- 13Basel III NSFR and Tier-1 gold
- 14IMF SDR composition
- 15Putting the macro geopolitics framework to work
- 16Read next
Macro & Geopolitics 2026: A Precious Metals Investor Overview
The macro geopolitics backdrop entering 2026 is the most consequential driver of precious metals pricing since the 1971 Nixon shock. Sovereign balance sheets are being restructured in real time, sanctions architecture is fragmenting cross-border settlement, and central banks are accumulating gold at a pace not seen since the Bretton Woods era. For the precious metals investor, understanding the macro geopolitics terrain is not optional ornamentation around a technical chart β it is the primary lens through which every position must be sized. This pillar overview walks through five sub-clusters: de-dollarisation, sanctions and reserves, war premia, the inflation hedge debate, and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) plumbing that connects them.
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De-dollarisation and the BRICS+ settlement layer
The phrase de-dollarisation is overused, but the empirical signal is unambiguous. According to IMF COFER data, the US dollar share of allocated global reserves has drifted from roughly 72% in 2000 to under 58% by late 2025, with the deficit absorbed mostly by gold and a basket of non-traditional currencies including the renminbi, Australian dollar and Canadian dollar.
BRICS+ expansion and mBridge
The enlarged BRICS+ bloc β which now includes the UAE, Iran, Egypt and Ethiopia alongside the founding five β has explicitly framed local-currency settlement as a strategic priority. Project mBridge, the multi-CBDC platform piloted by the BIS Innovation Hub with the People's Bank of China, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Bank of Thailand and Central Bank of the UAE, demonstrated atomic cross-border settlement without correspondent-bank dollar legs. Although the BIS formally exited mBridge in 2024, the platform continued under participating central banks. For gold investors, the relevance is mechanical: every cross-border trade that settles outside the dollar reduces the structural bid for Treasuries and increases the marginal demand for neutral reserve assets.
Petrodollar cracks
The 1974 Saudi-US understanding under which oil was priced and settled in dollars has not been formally rescinded, but it has been quietly diluted. Saudi Aramco has accepted CNY for selected cargoes since 2023, and the Shanghai International Energy Exchange (INE) yuan-denominated crude futures have grown into a credible price-discovery venue.
Central banks dumping Treasuries for gold
The World Gold Council reported net central bank gold purchases of roughly 1,037 tonnes in 2023 and 1,045 tonnes in 2024 β the second and third highest annual prints since records began. The People's Bank of China, National Bank of Poland, Reserve Bank of India, Central Bank of TΓΌrkiye and Monetary Authority of Singapore were repeat buyers. See /categories/de-dollarisation and the cross-pillar /categories/gold-markets for tonnage breakdowns.
Sanctions and reserves: the post-2022 regime
The February 2022 freezing of approximately USD 300 billion of Bank of Russia foreign-exchange reserves was the most consequential reserve management event since Nixon closed the gold window. It demonstrated that no foreign-held FX reserve denominated in a sanctioning jurisdiction's currency is unconditionally usable.
OFAC compliance and the bullion chain
The US Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) maintains the Specially Designated Nationals list and a growing list of secondary-sanction jurisdictions. The London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) suspended Russian refiners β Krastsvetmet, Novosibirsk, Prioksky, Uralelectromed, Moscow Special Alloys Processing Plant and Shyolkovsky Factory β from the Good Delivery List in March 2022. The practical impact: Russian-origin bars produced after 7 March 2022 are not deliverable into LBMA-cleared loco London accounts, COMEX or major Asian vaults.
Reserve diversification beyond gold
Reserve managers have also added renminbi sovereign debt, supranational paper (EIB, IBRD) and selected commodity-linked instruments. The OECD's 2024 reserve management survey found 23 of 71 surveyed central banks were actively reviewing custody arrangements specifically because of the 2022 freeze precedent. See /categories/sanctions-reserves.
War premia: Middle East, Ukraine and tail-risk pricing
Gold and silver carry an embedded geopolitical option premium. Quantifying it is imperfect, but the residual after stripping real rates, DXY and ETF flows is consistently positive during active kinetic conflict.
| Conflict event | Date | Spot gold move (T+5 days) | Implied vol shift |
|---|---|---|---|
| Russia invades Ukraine | Feb 2022 | +5.8% | +6 vol points |
| Hamas attack on Israel | Oct 2023 | +3.1% | +4 vol points |
| Iran-Israel direct strikes | Apr 2024 | +2.4% | +3 vol points |
| Iran-Israel escalation | Oct 2024 | +1.9% | +2.5 vol points |
| Red Sea Houthi disruptions | 2024 cumulative | +4.0% | n/a |
War premia tend to decay within 60-90 days unless the conflict produces durable shifts in either reserve allocation or oil supply. The Ukraine conflict produced both, which is why the 2022 premium has not reverted.

See /categories/war-premia for event studies and the cross-pillar /categories/silver-markets for silver-specific responses.
The inflation hedge debate: gold vs CPI vs TIPS
The assertion that gold is an inflation hedge is true on a multi-decade horizon and unreliable on a one-to-five-year horizon. Between 1980 and 2000, US headline CPI rose by roughly 130% while spot gold fell from USD 850 to USD 280 β an outright real loss of around 80%. Between 2000 and 2025, gold compounded above CPI by a wide margin.
Gold vs Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities
TIPS provide an explicit CPI linkage and a real coupon. Gold provides neither, but compensates by carrying no credit risk and no jurisdictional risk. The empirical correlation between spot gold and the 10-year US TIPS real yield has averaged around -0.7 since 2008, meaning gold typically rallies when real yields fall.
Why the hedge fails over short horizons
Gold also responds to dollar strength, ETF flows, central bank purchases and futures positioning. Any of these can dominate the inflation signal in a given quarter. Investors who treat gold as a one-for-one CPI swap are repeatedly disappointed; investors who treat it as a long-duration real asset with embedded geopolitical optionality tend to be vindicated.
See /categories/inflation-hedge.
BIS, IMF and the prudential plumbing
The regulatory architecture sitting beneath bullion is more important than retail commentary acknowledges.
Basel III NSFR and Tier-1 gold
Under the Basel III Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), implemented in the EU and UK from 2021-2022, allocated physical gold held on the balance sheet attracts a Required Stable Funding (RSF) factor of 0% when offset against gold liabilities, but unallocated gold attracts an 85% RSF. This mechanically penalises bullion banks running large unallocated books and was a structural driver of the widening EFP (Exchange For Physical) spreads observed in 2020-2022.
| Asset class | RSF factor | ASF factor |
|---|---|---|
| Allocated physical gold (matched) | 0% | n/a |
| Unallocated gold receivables | 85% | n/a |
| Sovereign debt (HQLA Level 1) | 5% | n/a |
| Retail deposits (stable) | n/a | 95% |
| Wholesale funding <6m | n/a | 0-50% |
IMF SDR composition
The IMF Special Drawing Right is currently weighted USD 43.4%, EUR 29.3%, CNY 12.3%, JPY 7.6%, GBP 7.4% (2022 review, effective August 2022). The next quinquennial review is scheduled for 2027. Any further increase in the CNY weight will be read by markets as a structural step in de-dollarisation.
See /categories/bis-imf and /categories/mining-equities for upstream exposure.
Putting the macro geopolitics framework to work
A disciplined precious metals allocation in 2026 should be sized against three questions: what is the trajectory of the dollar share of global reserves, what is the credible probability of further sanctions-driven reserve freezes, and what is the real yield path. The first two argue for a structural overweight; the third governs the cyclical timing.
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